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LAMBERT V. CALIFORNIA
A

DERELICT ON THE WATERS OF THE LAW?

A Los Angeles municipal ordinance makes it an offense for a person
who has been convicted of a crime punishable in California as a felony
to remain in the city for more than five clays without registering with the
Chief of Police.' Defendant in Lam bert v. California2 had previously
been convicted of forgery-a felony in California. It was asserted at the
trial that the defendant had no knowledge of the registration statute, and
there was no evidence as to the probability of such knowledge. The defendant was found guility, fined two hundred fifty dollars, placed on
probation for three years.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision, five to four,
finding that the ordinance was a violation of due process tnder the Fourteenth Amendment, in not requiring knowledge or probability of knowledge
where the conduct of the defendant is "wholly passive-mere failure to
register." 3 The majority opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Douglas admits
that ignorance of the law is no excuse- and recognizes the wide latitude
given to lawmakers to declare an offense and exclude elements of diligence
and knowledge from its definition,5' but finds a violation of due process
where the person is wholly passive and unaware of any wrongdoing. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, criticized the majority's distinction between
doing and not doing as a criteria.( Frankfurter further stated that he
was "confident that the present decision will turn out to be an isolated
deviation from a strong current of precedents-a derelict on the waters of
the law.'' 7
Is the holding of the majority a derelict on the waters of the law? At
first glance, it would appear so. The fact that the Court quoted from
Holmes, The Common Law,s coupled with the fact that there was no
precedent cited would tend to indicate that the holding was an anomaly.
Of all the powers of local government the police power is "one of the
least limitable.
...
1 Due process places some limit on this exercise, however. In civil law there are innumerable situations in which notice is
required and a penalty or forfeiture imposed for mere failure to act.
Illustrating this point are several recent cases requiring notice before
property interests can be disturbed.' 0
1.
2.
3.

Los Angeles Municipal Code § 52.39.
355 U.S. 225 (1957).
Id. at 228.

4.
5.

Supra note 2 at 228, Shevlin Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57 (1910).
Supra note 2 at 228; Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 559, 578
(6 11).
6. Supra note 2 at 230.

7.

Supra note 2 at 231.

8.

Supra note 2 at 229; "A law which punished conduct which would not be blame-

9.

worthy in the average member of the community would be too severe for that
community to bear." Holmes, The Common Law 50 (1946).
Supra note 2 at 228; Disrtict of Columbia v. Brook, 214 U.S. 138 at 149 (1909).

10.

Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1949); Covey v. Town of
Somers, 351 U.S. 141

(1956); Walker v. Hutchison City, 352 U.S. 112 (1956).

[52]
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Prior to the Lambert decision an awareness of some wrongdoing was
an element only of crimes which by their very nature were wrongful and
were crimes at common law-offenses mala in se. Crimes although innocent in themselves but prescribed by statute-offenses mala prohibitawere generally subject to strict enforcement regardless of any awareness of
wrongdoing in the defendant. The constitutionality of a statute imposing
strict liability was generally determined by the mala in se-mala prohibita
test in the federal courts."1 Several mala prohibita convictions were sustained by the United States Supreme Court over the due process objections
12
even though the defendant was not aware of any wrongdoing.
Although the Supreme Court upheld the conviction in Balint v. United
States' on the mala prohibita rule, it scrutinized the legislative intent of
the statute prescribing the crime. The Court reasoned that, "Congress
weighed the possible injustice . . . against the evil . . . and concluded that

the latter was the result preferable to be avoided."'14 Mr. Justice Frankfurter applied a similar test in upholding the conviction in United States v.
Dotterweich'5 wherein he stated that:
Such legislation dispenses with the conventional requirement for
criminal conduct-awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest
of the larger good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a
person otherwise innocent but standing in a responsible relation
to public danger. 16
Was the Lambert decision a derelict from Frankfurter's reasoning in the
Dotterweich case? Was Mrs. Lambert standing in a responsible relation
to public danger? In effect, the California registration statute is merely
"a law enforcement technique designed for the convenience of law enforcement agencies through which a list of names and addresses of felons
then residing in a given community is compiled."' 7 Thus, could the
legislature weigh the possibility of injustice against the evil that the statute
was intended to prevent and conclude that the possible evil in failing to
register outweighed the injustice of a conviction for such failure? In
the Lambert case where the court found that the statute was a mere
"enforcement technique,""' was not the evil weighed against the injustice?
Was this method of testing the validity of a statute a derelict from the
19
decision in Balint v. United States?
Douglas did not disregard previous decisions which upheld strict
liability in mala prohibita offenses but distinguished the fact situations
in the previous cases from those in the Lambert case. In the Lambert case
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Morrisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v. Balint, 258
U.S. 250 (1922) ; United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922).
258 U.S. 250 (1922).
Id. at 281.
320 U.S. 277 (1943).
Id. at 281.
Supra note 2 at 229.
Supra note 2 at 229.
Supra note 13.
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the violation was unaccompanied by any activity whatever and mere presence in the city was the test of liability. Coupled with defendant's mere
nonfeasance was the lack of any circumstances which might move one to
inquire into the necessity of acting. 20 Although there was no precedent
to support the Court's decision, the majority opinion was not a deviation
from a strong current of precedent, but it was a deviation from a strong
current of fact situations previously considered by the Court.
The majority in the Lambert case found that the legislature had exercised its police power in an unreasonable and arbitrary manner and
thus had deprived the defendant of due process of law. The distinctive
feature of the Lambert case is the fact that it struck clown the mala prohibita barrier previously protecting statutes excluding knowledge or probability of knowledge as an element of the crime. Whether or not the

Lambert decision represents a departure from prior holdings will be determined by clarification of the decision in subsequent cases. In United
States v. Juzwiak 21 the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second
Circuit, refused to extend the Lambert rule. In that case the defendant
was a seaman who had previously been convicted of a narcotics violation.
He subsequently left the United States without registering as required by
a federal registration statute. 22 Refusing defendant's evidence of lack of
knowledge of the statute, the Court distinguished the case from the Lambert
case on three grounds. 1) In the Juzwiak case there was an affirmative
act, feasance-leaving the country. Whereas in the Lambert case there
was a mere nonfeasance-failure to register. 2) The purpose of the federal
narcotics registration statute was to control the amount of illegal narcotics
crossing the border. Whereas the purpose of the Los Angeles ordinance
was to conveniently aid the police department. 3) Leaving the country in
the Juzwiak case was an uncommon event likely to put the defendant on
notice; whereas, living in a city was a common event not likely to put the
defendant on notice.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit similarly refused to extend
the Lam bert doctrine in Reyes v. United States23 and Burks v. United
States.2 4 The Reyes - 5 case, involving violation of a narcotics registration
law, was distinguished from the Lambert case on the basis of
feasance compared to nonfeasance and the difference in the legislative
intent of the two statutes. The Burks case, involving a conviction for
conducting a wagering pool and willfully failing to register with the Internal Revenue District Office, was distinguished from the Lambert case on
the basis of the type of crime. The Court said the Lambert rule "does
not apply to crimes created by statute which involve public welfare.' 26
20.

Supra note 2 at 229.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

258 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1958).
19 C.F.R. § 23.9a (Supp. 1958).
258 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1958).
287 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1961).
Supra note 23.
Supra note 24 at 125.

NoTEns
2s
Both the Juzwiak2 7 case and the Reyes case give lip service to the

mala in se-mala prohibita test which was abolished by the Lambert2 case.
This does not necessarily indicate, however, that the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Second and Ninth Circuits felt that the Lambert
decision was a derelict on the waters of the law, as these courts clearly
distinguished the fact situations and based their decisions on these distinctions.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter contends, in his dissent in Lambert v. California, that the distinction "between feasance and nonfeasance . .. is inadmis30
sible as a line between constitutionality and unconstitutionality."
Frankfurter is apparently suggesting that the majority decision stands for
the rule that all crimes of' omission are unconstitutional unless the defendant has actual or probable knowledge of the offense. The majority decision does not stand for the proposition that all crimes of omission are
unconstitutional. The rule applies only to cases in which the defendant
is completely ignorant of the regulation, there is not sufficient means of
notification, the regulation attempts to induce an act rather than to induce
forebearance, the regulation is outside the normal type of welfare offenses,
and the regulation gives no chance for the defendant to comply upon first
notice. The decision was apparently based on the moral implications of
imposing criminal guilt on a blameless person. "[Tlhe Lambert case
disclosed so sharp a division in the Court that extension of its policy to
Although extension of the
new areas may well be thought tnlikely. '"1It
rule is unlikely, the majority decision leaves the door open for the courts to
exonerate a defendant when conviction would be contrary to our notions
of morals and justice. The majority decision in Lambert v. California is
not "a derelict on the waters of the law"; it is a moral undercurrent affecting
only a limited number of cases which comes within a narrow stream of
fact situations.
Criminal registration statutes such as the one in the Lambert case
32
have been enacted in over fifty major cities in over thirty different states.
The stated objective of the criminal registration laws is to aid the police
in preventing criminal activities and apprehending perpetrators thereof.
Compulsory registration laws would appear to fall within the police powers
of the states. The Supreme Court has upheld statutes imposing registration and identification requirements upon persons who were thought to

present a particular danger to the community. The privileges and imnunities, due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, however, limit the states' police power in that the protection
of society by state action must not unduly infringe upon individual liber27.

28.
29.

Supra note 21 at 847.

Supra note 23 at 782.
Supra note 2 at 229.

30. Supra note 2 at 231.

31. Supra note 21 at 848.
32. For a comprehensive view of registration statutes, see Note, 103 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
60 (1954).
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ties. Consequently, it is difficult to make a general statement as to the
constitutionality or unconstitutionality of criminal registration statutes.
Substantive due process requires that there be a relationship between
the objective sought to be attained and the means employed to achieve
that end. The relationship between the means and the end will depend
upon whether registration and identification of convicted persons enables
the community to protect itself from a genuine evil or danger. The most
difficult and most significant factor in determining the social desirability
and constitutionality of these laws is whether convicted persons present a
sufficient danger to the community to warrant imposition of the registration requirements. In the registration statute upheld by the Supreme
Court, the registration liability was imposed on individuals who were presently engaged in activity that could be considered dangerous. Since registration statutes cannot be labeled constitutional or unconstitutional per
se, the validity of the statute can only be determined by applying it to each
individual defendant.
The Lambert case "unmistakably points the right way in the right
direction and will ultimately lead to a complete moral recovery of our
penal law. . . . [Tihe really important and encouraging matter is that
the Supreme Court has told us that it detests the immoral use or misuse of
the criminal sanction of a morally blameless defendant. . . .absolute criminal liability is beginning to end in America." 3 3
JAMES E. BARNES
33.

42 Minn. L. Rev. 1043 at 1104 (1958).

